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THE "DEFENSELESS" MARRIAGE ACT: THE
CONSTIUTIONALITY OF THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE
ACT AS AN EXTENSION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
The arc of history is long, but it bends toward justice.
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
Because 1996 was an election year, American attention was
unquestionably drawn to the political agenda of Congress, its mem-
bers actively seeking reelection, and the Presidential campaign. A
Congressional issue receiving much attention prior to the election
was the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). Two
distinct provisions of the United States Code are amended by
DOMA. First, DOMA amends Title 1 of the U.S. Code by insert-
ing a "Definition of Marriage." This "definition" states that "mar-
riage" is the legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and a "spouse" must be a person of the oppo-
site sex.' Second, DOMA amends Title 28 with the addition of
. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as
amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
z See 1 U.S.C § 7 (Supp. 11 1996). The amendment reads:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regula-
tion, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the
United States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man
and one woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.
Id. When the Defense of Marriage Act was introduced into the Senate by Senator Don
Nickles (R-OK) he argued that these congressional definitions of "marriage" and "spouse"
were "based on common understanding rooted in our Nation's history, our statutes and
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§1738C. It reads:
No State ... shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State ...
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex
that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other
State ... or a right or claim arising from such relation-
ship.
3
The stated purpose of DOMA is to "define and protect the
institution of marriage."4 Politicians argue that DOMA was pro-
posed in response to the landmark 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court
decision which held that Hawaii's failure to recognize same-sex
marriages violated Hawaii's Constitution, absent a compelling state
interest.' Others assert the proposal of DOMA was nothing more
than election year politics and would more appropriately be entitled
"The Defense of Endangered Republican Candidates Act." Propo-
nents of DOMA argue this federal legislation is essential to
strengthen the American family and is "morally necessary."7 How-
ever, opponents argue Congress has overstepped its grant of legis-
lative power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S.
our case law." 142 CONG. REc. S10103 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Nickles). The Senator stated the definitions "merely reaffirm what Americans have meant
for 200 years" when using such words. Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. 1 1996).
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); see also 142 CONG. REC. S10101
(daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lott); 142 CONG. REc. S4870 (daily ed.
Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Nickles). Senator Nickles argued:
If Hawaii sanctions same-sex "marriage," the implications will be felt far be-
yond Hawaii. Because Article IV of the U.S. Constitution requires every State
to give "full faith and credit" to the "Public Acts, Records, and Judicial [sic]
Proceedings" of each State, the other 49 States will be faced with recognizing
Hawaii's same-sex "marriages" even though no State now sanctions such rela-
tionships.
142 CONG. Rec. S4871 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Nickles).
6 A Bill to Define and Protect the Institution of Marriage: Hearing on S. 1740 Be-
fore the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 104th Cong. 3 (1996)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy). Senator Kennedy (D-MA) asserts that the Senate Judiciary
Committee spent too much precious congressional time on DOMA, as it is an "offensive,
unnecessary and divisive" piece of legislation. Id. Senator Kennedy also refers to DOMA
as the "Defense of Intolerance Act" which he describes as a "mean-spirited form of legis-
lative gay-bashing" designed to divide Americans and inflame the public before the 1996
November election. Id.; see also 142 CONG. REC. 117277 (daily ed. July 11, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Woolsey); Raul Reidinger, Politically Expedient: What Are Legislators
Really Up to When They Pass Laws of Dubious Constitutionality?, 82 A.B.A. J. 79
(1996).
7. 142 CONG. REc. 17494 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Smith). Rep-
resentative Smith (R-TX) argues that "[s]ame-sex 'marriages' demean the fundamental in-
stitution of marriage" and "legitimize unnatural and immoral behavior" while trivializing
and belittling marriage. Id.
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Constitution and is intruding upon a constitutional power reserved
to the states.8
This Note will not address the section of Title 1 amended by
Congress through DOMA, which defines the terms "marriage" and
"spouse" for federal benefit purposes. While strong Equal Protec-
tion arguments exist in opposition to the contention that this "defi-
nition" of marriage is a constitutional exercise of Congress' legisla-
tive power, these issues lie beyond the scope of this Note.'
However, the amendment to Title 28, concerning the power of
states to refuse to give effect to same-sex marriages, is analyzed
herein through an examination of Congress' legislative power under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The first
section of this Note discusses the motivating factors behind the
congressional enactment of DOMA. The second and third sections
develop the history and purposes underlying both the constitutional
grant of legislative power to Congress through the Clause and
current conflicts of law analysis regarding conflicting state marriage
laws and policies. The fourth section analyzes Congress' past im-
plementation of its legislative power under the Full Faith and Cred-
it Clause in the family law context. Sections five and six assert
that Congress has overstepped its legislative boundaries by enacting
an amendment that stands in direct opposition to the inherent
meaning and purpose of the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Finally, this author concludes that DOMA is an unconstitu-
tional and unprecedented extension of Congress' power and will
L See 142 CONG. REC. S10104 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Moseley-Braun); 142 CONG. Rac. S10102 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
' For arguments and analysis regarding Equal Protection and constitutional claims as
poss'ble "tool[s] to combat the denial" of same-sex marriage, see Lisa M. Farabee, Mar-
riage, Equal Protection, and New Judicial Federalism: A View from the States, 14 YALE
L. & POV'Y REV. 237, 262 (1996); Henry J. Reske, A Matter of Full Faith. Legislatures
Scramble to Bar Recognition of Gay Marriages, 82 A.B.A. J. 32 (1996). One such consti-
tutional challenge has already been announced by the Lambda Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund, co-counsel serving on the Baehr case. See Todd S. Purdum, Heat on Clinton
for Gay Marriage Ruling, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 22, 1996, at A2.
The Supreme Court's decision in the Colorado Equal Protection case of Romer v.
Evans increases the "tools" with which to challenge DOMA's constitutionality. See 116 S.
Ct. 1620 (1996). The Romer Court struck down a Colorado anti-gay referendum, stating
that it could not survive even under a rational basis Equal Protection standard. See id.
Constitutional scholar Cass R. Sunstein of the University of Chicago stated in his testimo-
ny before the Judiciary Committee that DOMA is very similar to the Colorado referen-
dum. See A Bill to Define and Protect the Institution of Marriage: Hearing on S. 1740
Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 104th Cong. 42
(1996) (statement of Professor Cass R. Sunstein). Professor Sunstein stated that DOMA is
"unprecedented" and an "oddity in our constitutional tradition ... drawn explicitly in
terms of sexual orientation." Drawn along "the particular line that it does, [DOMA] risks
running afoul of Romer's prohibition on'laws based on animus against homosexuals." Id.
at 48.
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undoubtedly have a detrimental effect upon the institution of mar-
riage, conflicts of law doctrine, and family law in general.
I. THE CONGRESSIONAL IMPETUS BEHIND DOMA
On July 12, 1996, after lengthy debate, the United States
House of Representatives passed House Resolution 3396, entitled
the "Defense of Marriage Act!"' (DOMA). Section 2(a) of the Act
amends the United States Code to provide that no state is required
to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of
any other state respecting any relationship between two people of
the same sex that is recognized as a marriage by the laws of that
other state." The House passed DOMA by a vote of 342 to 67.12
In September of 1996, the Senate followed suit and passed DOMA
by an overwhelming vote of 85 to 14.13
According to DOMA's Senate sponsor, Don Nickles (R-OK),
this Act originated as a response to the May, 1993 ruling of the
Hawaii Supreme Court in the case of Baehr v. Lewin. 4 In Baehr,
the case of same-sex couples seeking legal marriage recognition
was remanded to the trial court to determine whether Hawaii's
marriage statutes, which declare that a marriage can only be recog-
nized as between a man and a woman, violated the state's constitu-
tional prohibition against discrimination based on sex." The Court
applied the strict scrutiny standard and held the marriage statutes
presumptively unconstitutional. Hawaii would have to justify the
statutes by proving the existence of a compelling state interest, to
which the statutes were narrowly drawn.'6 The case was remanded
to the trial court for determination consistent with the Court's
" H.R. 3396, 104th Cong. (1996) (enacted).
See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
'z See 142 CONG. REC. H7505 (daily ed. July 12, 1996).
' At the time of the DOMA vote, the Senate also voted to reject a civil rights bill
entitled the Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 1996, S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996), by
a close vote of 50 to 49. See 142 CONG. REc. D914 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996). The pro-
posed Employment Nondiscrimination Act would have banned job discrimination based on
sexual orientation. See S. 2056, 104th. Cong. (1996).
'4 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
'5. See id. This case arose when several same-sex couples decided they wanted to
marry and desired the state of Hawaii to legally recognize their marriages. After summary
judgment was ordered for the State, the couples appealed to the Supreme Court of Ha-
waii, arguing the State's refusal to grant them marriage licenses violated their right to pri-
vacy, equal protection, and due process. The Hawaii Supreme Court determined summary
judgment was incorrect as a matter of law and remanded the case to the trial court. The
supreme court stated that the defendants would have to overcome a presumption of the
marriage statutes' unconstitutionality as required under a strict scrutiny standard. Strict
scrutiny would be applied under an Equal Protection analysis because the statutes based
the issuance of a marriage license upon a person's sex, a suspect class as determined by
a reading of the Hawaii Constitution. See id.
" See id.
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ruling 1 7
Subsequent to this ruling, state legislatures expressed concern
that Hawaii's final decision would ultimately dictate whether they
would have to recognize such same-sex marriages. 8 The state leg-
islatures based their concern on the possibility that gay couples
would travel to Hawaii to be married and then return to their home
states to seek the benefits of that marriage.' 9 Indeed, the legisla-
tures of over thirty states introduced legislation in response to
Baehr to ensure they would not be obligated to recognize same-sex
marriage licenses issued in states such as Hawaii.'a Further, many
authors agreed that Baehr had the potential to force broad-sweeping
acceptance of same-sex marriages upon other U.S. states.2 Evi-
dently, Congress felt the perceived threat of forced recognition of
same-sex marriages was important enough to justify federal steps.
DOMA was calculated to allow states the power to refuse to honor
same-sex marriages sa
Because marriage is an institution traditionally controlled exclu-
sively by state governments, through the powers reserved to them
by the Constitution, a Constitutional source of authority was neces-
sary to empower Congress to legislate in this family law area.'a
Thus, the DOMA congressional debates centered around the consti-
tutionality of this Act as a product of Congress' legislative power
bestowed under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Article IV, Sec-
tion 1 of the U.S. Constitution.' Proponents of DOMA argue that
17. See iL Upon remand to the trial court, the State presented its policy arguments
against same-sex marriage licensing. See Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235
(Hawaii Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). On December 3, 1996, Judge Kevin S. L. Chang held
that the State had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest sufficient to justify withhold-
ing the legal status of marriage from the parties. See id. The State had failed to establish
that the Hawaii statutes prohibiting same-sex marriage were narrowly drawn to avoid any
unnecessary abridgment of the parties' constitutional rights. See id. The court held, under
the strict scrutiny standard, that the same-sex classifications in Hawaii's marriage statutes
were facially unconstitutional and violated the Equal Protection Clause of Hawaii's state
constitution. See id.
l See Reske, supra note 9.
19. See id.
2 See id.
2" See id.; see also Habib A. Balian, 'Til Death Do Us Part: Granting Full Faith
and Credit to Marital Status, 68 S. CAL L. REv. 397 (1995); Barbara J. Cox, "Coming
Out": The Practical Battles of Being Visible as a Lesbian, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WoMEN's STUD. 89 (1995); Joseph W. Hovermill, A Conflicts of Law and Morals: The
Choice of Law Implications of Hawaii's Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 53 MD. L.
REV. 450 (1994); Harold P. Schombert, Baehr v. Lewin How Far Has the Door Been
Opened? Finding a State Policy for Recognizing Same-Sex Marriages, 16 WOMEN'S RTS.
L. RE'. 331 (1995).
2L See 142 CONG. REc. S10102 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kenne-
dy).
21 See 142 CONG. REC. S10101 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lott).
- See Todd D. Robichaud, Defense of Marriage or Attack on Family?, NAT'L L.J.,
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it is a constitutional extension of Congress' power under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, while opponents contend DOMA is a
"constitutionally ill-advised intrusion" into an area of law handled
at the state level for the past 200 years.' In order to evaluate the
strength of these opposing arguments, the history and purpose of
Congress' grant of legislative power under the Full Faith and Cred-
it Clause must be examined.
II. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF CONGREsSIONAL LEGISLATIVE
POWER UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
The Full Faith and Credit Clause (the "Clause") orders the
states to give "Full Faith and Credit" to the "public acts, records
and judicial proceedings of every other state."'  At the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787 (the "Convention"), the drafters of the
United States Constitution adopted the Clause almost word for
word from the Articles of Confederation.' However, the
Convention's Framers did extend the Articles' provision of Full
Faith and Credit to include the non-judicial "public" acts and re-
cords of a state.2 Further, the Framers empowered Congress to
prescribe by the general laws the manners in which such acts, re-
cords, and proceedings should be proved and their actual effects
upon the states.29
During the Convention, debates arose with regard to Congress'
power to determine the "effect" of such state laws.' Representa-
tive Randolph, a member of the Convention, feared the definition
of Congress' power in this context would give the federal govern-
ment the opportunity to usurp powers delegated to the states by the
Constitution.3' Randolph's apprehension was likely due to the
Framers' concern about good state relations when the Constitution
was drafted. The Framers were "well aware that failure [of states]
to recognize the acts of sister states would not further the life of
the Confederation."'32 Although Randolph's fellow Framers consid-
Sept. 30, 1996, at A24.
M See 142 CONG. REc. S10102 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kenne-
dy).
" U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
27- See Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit: The Lawyer's Clause of the Consti-
tution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1944); James D. Sumner, The Full Faith and Credit
Clause: Its History and Purpose, 34 OR. L. REV. 224 (1955).
See Jackson, supra note 27, at 4.
" See id.
See id. at 5 (citing MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
(1911)).
31. See id.
32- Jean A. Mortland, Interstate Federalism: Effect of Full Faith and Credit to Judg-
ments, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV. 47, 48 (1990) (citing Sumner, supra note 27, at 229).
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ered his argument, the Clause was eventually incorporated into the
Constitution as written."
The historical interpretation of the actual "reach" of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause reveals considerable confusion over the
extent to which the Framers intended that a judgment or act of a
sister state be truly enforceable in another state.? However, the
clear purpose proposed by the Framers of the Clause was estab-
lishing a principle of uniformity throughout the Union.' The
Framers intended that the Clause would alter the status of the
several states as separate sovereign entities.' The Clause effective-
ly disavowed the idea that the states were free to ignore the rights
and obligations of their neighboring states.37
At the time of the Constitutional Convention, the states wanted
to retain as much of their independence as possible.3 Consequent-
ly, the Framers were fearful that the separate states would choose
to ignore the laws of other states as had occurred under the Arti-
cles of Confederation. As Justice Story put it, the purpose of the
Clause was "to give each State a higher security and confidence in
the others," and to provide for uniformity across state lines." The
Clause was one of the provisions incorporated into the Constitution
by the Framers for the "purpose of transforming an aggregation of
independent, sovereign States into a nation."'" Arguing in the
same vein, Deborah M. Henson asserts that the major purpose of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause was to create uniformity in the
application of the law and to prevent confusion within the newly
formed United States.42 The Clause was designed by its Framers
3 See Jackson, supra note 27, at 5.
See Mortland, supra note 32, at 48; see also Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S.
226 (1945). In Williams, the Supreme Court stated that "the Full Faith and Credit Clause
puts the Constitution behind a judgment instead of the too fluid, ill-defined concept of
'comity.'" Id. at 228. The Court went on to state, "'[t]here is scarcely any doctrine of the
law which . .. is in a more unreduced and uncertain condition than that which relates to
the question what force and effect should be given by the courts of one nation to the
judgments rendered by the courts of another nation.'" Id. at 228 n.4 (quoting Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 116 (1895)).
" See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439-40 (1943), overruled by
Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
3 See id.
. See id.
See Walter W. Cook, The Powers of Congress under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421, 422 (1919).
' See id. at 423-24 (discussing the transformation of the Clause from its "literal de-
scendant" in the Articles of Confederation to its present form).
' 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNrrED STATES
190 (5th ed. 1891); see also Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-
77 (1935).
AL Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 271-72 (1980) (quoting
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948)).
', See Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?:
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to help create a "united" states in which individual states would
not compete against one another. Its anticipated function was to
ensure that states would treat one another as equals rather than as
competitors.43
The Supreme Court's treatment of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause is consistent with the interpretation of the Clause as pos-
sessing a strong unifying purpose. In 1943, the Court described the
Clause as a nationally unifying force:
It altered the status of the several states as independent
foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore the rights and
obligations created under the laws or established by the
judicial proceedings of the others, by making each [state]
an integral part of a single nation, in which rights...
established in any [state] are given nation-wide applica-
tion.'
More recently, Justice White asserted that while one purpose of the
Clause was "to bring an end to increased litigation," the major
purpose was "to act as a nationally unifying force."'4
The grant of legislative power to Congress under the Clause
suggests it was designed to ensure that Congress could expand the
reach of states' decisions and judgments.' This endowment of
Congressional legislative power through the Full Faith and Credit
Clause clearly illustrates the Framers' purpose of creating an inte-
grative power that would secure uniformity between the many parts
of their newly united states.
Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States' Choice of Law Regarding
the Status and Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin,
32 U. LouisvILLE J. FAm. L. 551, 584-85 (1994).
41 See 142 CONG. REc. S10113 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Boxer)
("Mhe Clause was designed to help create a 'united' states.... "); ROBERT A. LEFiAR,
AMERIuc CoNFLIcTS LAw § 73 (3d ed. 1977); Jackson, supra note 27, at 32 C"IMhe
Full Faith and Credit Clause is the foundation of any hope we may have for a truly na-
tional system of justice, based on the preservation but better integration of the local juris-
dictions we have.").
' Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943), overruled by Thomas
v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
' Thomas v. Washington Gas Light, Co., 448 U.S. 261, 288-89 (1980) (White, J.,
concurring).
4 See Cook, supra note 38, at 425-26 ("[T]he language of the Clause was intended
by its framers to give Congress the power 'by general laws' to 'prescribe the effect,' i.e.,
the legal effects or consequences, in other states of the 'public acts, records and judicial
proceedings' of a state.").
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MTI. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF CURRENT CONFLICTS OF LAW
ANALYSIS IN FAMILY LAW
Conflicts of law doctrine focuses, on transactions between states
having legal implications involving more than one state.47 When a
legal issue involves incidents or problems pertaining to more than
one state, "a court must determine which state's legal rules should
control the resolution of the problem."'
Family law creates some particular problems in the conflicts of
law arena.49 Family law involves personal relationships between
family members.'" The law treats family members as having creat-
ed a special "status" between them-a unique condition in which
the state now has an interest.5 ' This state interest arises at the
creation of the relationship, continues throughout its existence, and
endures even after its dissolution. 2 In the marriage relationship,
for example, the relationship dictates that the couple may not end
their association without "at least some form of approval by the
state, nor may [the couple] ignore their children without a great
deal of state intervention."5 After the dissolution of the marriage,
support payments, child custody, and visitation arrangements create
an ongoing need for state judicial supervision and management.54
An increasingly mobile family unit creates problems concerning
which state has jurisdiction to govern the many facets of this con-
tinuing relationship5 When more than one state has developed an
interest in some aspect of the marital relationship over time, appli-
cation of conflicts of law doctrine, used to determine which state's
law should prevail, may get very complicated.'
In resolving a conflicts of law issue, the Second Restatement of
Conflict of Laws (the "Second Restatement" or the "Restatement")
states that if no choice of law rule exists in the forum state to
address the issue, the law of the state with the most significant
relationship to the issue should apply." When an issue of mar-
4" See WILUAM M. RiCHMAN & WILLiAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICTS
OF LAw 1-4 (1984); see also LEFLAR, supra note 43, §§ 1-2; EUGENE F. SCOLES & PE-
TER HAY, CoNFucr OF LAW §§ 1.1-3 (2d ed. 1992); RUSSELL . WEnrRAUB, COMMEN-
TARY ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAW 1-10 (3d ed. 1986).
M' RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 47, at 2-3.
4' See id. at 313.
See id.
"* See id.
See id; see also Carabetta v. Carabetta, 438 A.2d 109 (Conn. 1980) (recognizing
state interest in marriage contract and validating a marriage solemnized although the par-
ties did not apply for the required marriage license).
SL RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 47, at 313.
See id.
See id.
See id.
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICrT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). The factors that
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riage validity arises, the state with the most significant connection
to the married couple is the appropriate one to adjudicate the valid-
ity issue. The current, universal conflicts of law rule employed to
ascertain the validity of a marriage legally obtained and ac-
knowledged in another state is to apply the governing law of the
state in which the marriage was celebrated. 8 Every state has the
power, within constitutional limits, to prescribe the manner in
which the marriage relationship will be legally created within its
jurisdiction. 9 This power arises from the state's significant con-
nection to its residents.'
In conflicts of law situations, basic public policy considerations
support the universal rule of applying the law of the state in which
the marriage was celebrated." A choice of law rule which vali-
dates out-of-state marriages rests on two main policy consider-
ations. 2 The first encompasses the consequential results of the
marital status: Sustaining an apparent out-of-state marriage provides
stability, certainty, and predictability to the parties' marriage rela-
tionship, as well as to society's expectations in general.63 Second,
the union should be recognized because it was entered into by the
parties in good faith reliance upon its validity."
will be relevant to choosing which law to apply include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems; (b) the relevant poli-
cies of the forum; (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue; (d)
the protection of justified expectations; (e) the basic policies underlying the
particular field of law; (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id.
s See id. § 283(2). The Second Restatement directs that states apply the laws of the
state where the marriage was celebrated or contracted unless an exception exists. See id.;
see also ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAW 376-78 (1962)
(noting that the current doctrine and court language assume a governing law of the place
of celebration); LEFLAR, supra note 43, § 220; WEINTRAUB, supra note 47, at 230-33.
. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 299-303 (1942).
See id.; Hovermill, supra note 21, at 444-47 (arguing the right of a state to deter-
mine who shall assume and occupy a marital relationship is a universally accepted rule).
6_' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFUiCr OF LAWS § 283 (1971); see also LEF.AR,
supra note 43, § 221 (stating several public policy reasons arising from the state's interest
in the marriage relationship); RICHMAN & REYNoLDs, supra note 47, at 315 ("[p]owerful
reasons support" a general rule of marriage validity); WEmrrRAuB, supra note 47, at 233-
36 (stating public policy reasons for why the rule is needed).
"z See LEFLAR, supra note 43, § 221 ("As a common law question, between one
state's law that would sustain a purported marriage and another that would defeat it, two
basic nonterritorial policies are present.").
6 See id. Leflar maintains that the parties and society wish to know whether the cou-
ple is married or not. See id. Predictability is a concern to the parties because of the
rights and responsibilities arising from the marriage relationship. Predictability is also nec-
essary to determine society's interest in the marriage. See id. "It would be messy to have
a couple married in one state and not in another, or to be uncertain of their status pend-
ing litigation to determine if they are married or unmarried." Id. § 220.
" See id. § 221; Hovermill, supra note 21, at 455 ("A choice of law rule that vali-
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An additional public policy justification for the need of a con-
flicts of law rule which validates out-of-state marriages is that this
rule protects the interests of third parties affected by the marriage
relationship.' For instance, out-of-state marriage recognition en-
sures the legitimation of children arising from the marriage rela-
tionship.' In addition, honoring out-of-state marriages promotes
uniformity and comity between the states.'
While these public policy considerations give rise to the gener-
al rule that out-of-state marriages are recognized if valid in the
state where celebrated, public policies may likewise create excep-
tions to the general conflicts of law rule of marriage validity. That
is, in spite of the "constitutional reins" the Full Faith and Credit
Clause has on a state's power to apply a conflicting state law, a
"trump card" remains with the state attempting to implement its
own law in place of the out-of-state law." This is the Public Poli-
cy Exception (the "Exception") which is available under the con-
flicts of law doctrine as well as in the constitutional arena.'
The Exception provides that a state is not bound by the doc-
trine of comity to give effect to a marriage celebrated under the
laws of another state if the marriage is, in effect, repugnant to that
state's own laws and legitimate public policies. 0 "Otherwise," as
dates out-of-state marriages ... protects party expectations.").
' See Hovermill, supra note 21, at 455.
6See id.
S" ee id Blacks Law Dictionary defines comity as "[a] willingness [of states] to
grant a privilege, not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good will." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIoNARY 267 (6th ed. 1990). For a good explanation of the doctrine of comity,
see Schombert, supra note 21, at 334-35. Schombert states that comity "occupies a rather
large area between mere courtesy and absolute obligation." Id at 334. Interestingly
enough, comity is exactly what the Framers sought as they fashioned the Full Faith and
Credit clause to promote uniformity and unity between the states.
" See Henson, supra note 42, at 555.
See id. The Public Policy Exception says that a state may not be required to apply
the law of a sister state if such law offends a substantial public policy of the forum
state. See id.
7 See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (stating that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause does not require a state to apply another state's law if it is in violation of that
state's legitimate public policy); Lynch v. Bowen, 681 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Il. 1988) (fail-
ing to recognize a common law marriage because of the state's strong public policy
against the recognition of such marriages, even though the "widow" relied in good faith
on the validity of the marriage); In re Mortenson's Estate, 316 P.2d 1106 (Ariz. 1957)
(holding an out-of-state marriage of first cousins void, even though solemnized in a state
recognizing such marriages; it offended Arizona's strong public policy against incestuous
marriages); Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65 (NJ. 1958) (refusing to uphold the
lower court's determination that an Indiana marriage statute permitting marriages of per-
sons under age eighteen was not so odious to New Jersey's public policy as to call for
the annulment of a 16 year old's marriage); In re Vetas' Estate, 170 P.2d 183 (Utah
1946) (holding that an out-of-state common law marriage was against Utah's strong public
policy against common law marriages and therefore not recognizable) (superseded by
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (1987)); Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp., 4 S.E.2d
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one court stated, "a state would be deprived of the very essence of
its sovereignty, the right of supremacy within its own borders."'
A state's "substantial" public policies are found in its court deci-
sions, constitution, laws, and legislation. 2
Authority such as the Second Restatement provides that the
validity of a marriage "will be determined by the local law of the
state which... has the most significant relationship to the spouses
and the marriage." The Restatement's general rule states that a
marriage is recognized as valid where 'celebrated unless it violates
a strong public policy of another state which had the most signifi-
cant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the
ceremony. 4 This Exception has enabled courts to invalidate out-
of-state marriages that violate strongly held beliefs or public poli-
cies of another state or country.' A state court may consider a
marriage so offensive to a local law or policy or to common "de-
cency" and morality that it refuses to validate the marriage under
the law of the state where it was celebrated.76
Categories of marriages consistently found in the past to violate
states' public policies are' (1) polygamous marriages," (2) inces-
tuous marriages,' 9 (3) interracial marriages," (4) marriages be-
tween persons under the legal age permitted by the forum state,"'
and (5) certain alleged common law marriages.2
364 (Va. 1939) (failing to recognize the out-of-state wedding of woman not legally di-
vorced from her first husband because of Virginia's public policy against bigamy).
71. Toler, 4 S.E.2d at 366.
7- See Henson, supra note 42, at 553; see also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 55
(Haw. 1993) (noting Hawaii's privacy concept is embodied in its Constitution).
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 283(1) (1971).
71 See id.
' See Hovermill, supra note 21, at 455.
7- See id.
" See Schombert, supra note 21, for an informative and detailed discussion of these
past public policy exceptions.
' See generally Earle v. Earle, 126 N.Y.S. 317 (App. Div. 1910) (stating that the
court would have invalidated marriage as contrary to public policy if found to be polyga-
mous); State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251 (1877); State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242 (1877) ("Po-
lygamy is unlawful, consequently such marriages will be held null everywhere.").
" See generally Mortensen v. Mortensen, 316 P.2d 1106 (Ariz. 1957) (holding a mar-
riage between first cousins was invalid even though solemnized in a state where legal).
But see In re Estate of Loughmiller, 629 P.2d 156 (Kan. 1981) (holding a marriage be-
tween first cousins was legal because it was solemnized in a state recognizing such mar-
riages).
See generally State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9 (1872) (holding interracial marriage occur-
ring legally in Mississippi was an indictable offense when the couple moved to Tennes-
see, where interracial marriages were illegal).
See generally Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65 (NJ. 1958) (holding that a
woman married at age sixteen was entitled to annulment in her best interests).
See generally Lynch v. Bowen, 681 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Il. 1988) (holding that
Illinois does not recognize common law marriages occurring in other states or in lllinois);
In re Vetas Estate, 170 P.2d 183 (Utah 1946) (holding plaintiffs' marriage was invalid
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Modem conflicts of law doctrine looks to the Restatement's
balancing formula to assess whether a strong public policy exists in
a state attempting to use the Exception to invalidate an out-of-state
marriage. 3 For example, in a conflicts of law situation in which a
marriage was performed in Kuwait, the Texas Court of Appeals
used the Restatement's "most significant relationship test" to invali-
date the second marriage of a husband. 4 In Seth v. Seth,' Mr.
Seth and his second wife were married in India after he divorced
his first wife in Kuwait by an ex parte procedure called talak. 6
The first wife was never notified of the divorce or remarriage."
In this situation, the court decided it would not employ the tradi-
tional, "valid where celebrated" conflicts test to the purported sec-
ond marriage of the parties, but would instead look to the
Restatement's "most significant relationship approach."' By using
the factors set out in section six of the Restatement,89 the court
weighed the policies for and against applying Texas law over the
law of India or Kuwait to the purported marriage of Mr. Seth to
his second wife. The court weighed the public policy consider-
ations, the connection of the parties to each "state," and the expec-
tations of the parties, and concluded that Texas law should prevail
over the laws of India or Kuwait. The court reasoned that Texas's
interest in the parties outweighed that of India or Kuwait because
the parties had lived in Texas for eight years, owned property in
Texas, and worked within the state." Therefore, under the "most
significant relationship" test, the court found Texas law applied and
declared the second marriage void as against Texas public poli-
cy.
91
This modem conflicts of law analysis uses the Restatement's
weighing formula to balance a cited state policy against the bene-
fits of validating the marriage. 2 As stated above, these benefits
include fulfilling the expectations of the parties and promoting
because they entered into common law marriage outside of Utah and returned to Utah at-
tempting to have the marriage recognized as valid).
a' See Note, In Sickness and in Health and Where Else?: Conflict of Laws and Rec-
ognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 109 HARV. L REV. 2038, 2048 (1996).
See Seth v. Seth, 694 S.W.2d 459 (rex. App. 1985).
*Id.
', See id. at 461.
'T See !&
Id. at 462.
8" See supra note 57.
See Seth, 694 S.W.2d at 463. The connections the parties had with India and
Kuwait were that Mr. Seth married his first wife in India, performed his talak divorce in
India, and married his alleged second wife in KuwaiL
"* See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNirucr OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
9. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 (1971).
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stability and harmony within the family.' Further, marriage law
contemplates two common policies which are furthered by the
recognition of out-of-state marriages: "(1) assuring complete indi-
vidual freedom in the exchange of consents, and (2) sustaining the
validity of relationships once parties freely enter into them."'94 Us-
ing the Restatement's balancing test, a court carefully weighs the
benefits of sustaining the marriage against the state's public poli-
cies for invalidating it, and determines which will prevail.
Together with the balancing of public policy considerations, a
state attempting to invalidate an out-of-state marriage by invoking
the Exception must also prove it has a strong interest in the parties
and their marriage. The Restatement's "significant relationship" test
is applied here to determine which state has the strongest connec-
tion to the parties. In practice, one state's interest in the parties
and their marriage is balanced against the parties' connections to
the state in which the marriage was celebrated to determine which
state's law will control the validity of the marriage. For instance, if
the parties had lived and worked in Indiana for eight years, flew to
Hawaii to marry, and returned to Indiana to live, Indiana's law
would likely prevail in a conflicts situation since Indiana had the
strongest connection to the married parties. Similarly, if the parties
lived and worked in Texas for eight years, married there, and later
moved to Indiana, Texas law would likely apply in a conflicts
situation, because Texas' connection to the parties would outweigh
the relatively new interest of Indiana.
Thus, while states may utilize the Public Policy Exception to
invalidate "repugnant" out-of-state marriages, the Second
Restatement's "most significant relationship" test dictates that the
state citing the policy arguments against validation must be the
state with the strongest connection to the parties. Accordingly, a
court could reject a state's public policy arguments if the state
lacked a significant connection to the parties. The court could then
uphold the marriage as valid, both within the state where the
marriage was celebrated as well as within other states.
IV. CONGRESS' PAST USAGE OF ITS LEGISLATIVE POWER UNDER
THE FULL FAITH AND CRED1T CLAUSE IN THE FAMILY LAW
CONTEXT-SPECIFICALLY, THE PARENTAL KIDNAPPING
PREVENTION AcT
The Full Faith and Credit Clause grants Congress the discre-
tionary power to enact amendments in order to implement the
91 See id.
' Note, supra note 83, at 2048; see also ScoLES AND HAY, supra note 47, § 13.2.
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Clause, requiring states to recognize certain sister state judgments,
acts, or records.95 Historically, Congress has rarely exercised this
legislative implementing power under the Clause in problem situa-
tions.O However, three examples exist in which Congress properly
exercised its legislative power and directed the states to give full
faith and credit to certain acts and judgments of other states: the
Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act of 1994
(FFCCSOA), the Violence Against Women Act of 199498
(VAWA), and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 19809
(PKPA). The FFCCSOA provides that states must enforce child
support determinations made by courts in other states."o Title II
of the VAWA requires states to recognize protective orders issued
in other states with regard to domestic violence. °" But the PKPA
is the primary example of a constitutional implementation of
Congress' legislative power under the Clause.
' See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The second portion of the Clause states, "And the
Congress may by the general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records,
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." Id.
9 See Henson, supra note 42, at 590; see also A Bill to Define and Protect the In-
stitution of Marriage: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the
United States Senate, 104th Cong 42 (1996) (statement of Professor Cass R. Sunstein).
17 Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act of 1994, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B
(1994).
' Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902-55
(codified into scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., & 42 U.S.C.).
'- Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994). "The appropriate authorities of each State (1) shall
enforce according to its terms a child support order made consistently with this section by
a court of another State; and (2) shall not seek or make a modification of such order ex-
cept in accordance with subsections (e), (f), and (i)." Id. Congress found that the
FFCCSOA was necessary due to a lack of a federal law requiring states to recognize
ongoing child support orders of other states. See Margaret Campbell Haynes, Federal Full
Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 14 DEL. LAW. 26 (1996). The Constitu-
tion did not require states to give effect to these support orders because they are not fi-
nal, but always subject to modification. See id. The consequence of this modifiability was
that a custodial parent seeking enforcement of prior support orders in a new state often
found the second state fashioning a new order in a different, usually lower amount. See
id. The FFCCSOA was enacted to improve interstate enforcement of prior child support
orders, to promote uniformity and reliability in support orders, and to specify state juris-
dictional rules regarding modifiability. See id.
20!. The VAWA, passed via the controversial Crime Bill of 1994, sought to address the
problems of gender-based violence through the application of five sections: Title I, Safe
Streets for Women, increases sentences for repeat offenders of crimes against women; Ti-
tle 11, Safe Homes for Women, centers on domestic violence; Title M, Civil Rights for
Women, provides a civil rights remedy for violent gender-based discrimination; Title IV,
Safe Campuses, furnishes funds to use in combating problems of women on college
campuses; and Title V, Equal Justice for Women in the Courts, provides for training of
state and federal judges to address the rising prevalence of gender bias in the courts. See
Catherine F. Klein, Full Faith and Credit: Interstate Enforcement of Protection Orders
Under the Violence Against Women Act, 29 FAM. L.Q. 253 (1995). Title Il, Safe Homes
for Women, provides that any protection order issued by the court of one state "shall be
accorded full faith and credit by the court of another State." 18 U.S.C. § 2265(b) (1994).
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The PKPA requires states to enforce or give full faith and
credit to child custody determinations made by other states."°
Congress, exerting its power under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, made the jurisdictional and substantive provisions of the
PKPA the criteria for recognition of out-of-state custody orders
when there arose a question of which state's judgment should be
upheld.1 The constitutionality of Congress's implementation of
the Clause through the enactment of the PKPA has been upheld as
an appropriate extension of Congressional power under the Clause
in Thompson v. Thompson.'"
The Court in Thompson stated Congress's principle aim in en-
acting the PKPA was to extend the requirements of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause to custody determinations."°s The primary diffi-
culty Congress sought to remedy via the PKPA was the inapplica-
bility of full faith and credit to out-of-state custody determina-
tions." The Court stated the PKPA was an "addendum to,
and ... therefore clearly intended to have the same operative
effect as, the federal full faith and credit statute," requiring states
to give preclusive effect to the judicial proceedings of sister
states.1"c The Court, therefore, upheld the PKPA as a proper and
constitutional extension of congressional implementing power under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 108
'0' See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994) ("[E]very state shall enforce according to its terms,
and shall not modify except as provided ... any child custody determination made con-
sistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State").
1-. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A; Mortland, supra note 32, at 69.
'o' 484 U.S. 174 (1987).
". See id. at 182.
' See id. at 181. Before Congress enacted PKPA, much confusion existed over inter-
state custody disputes resulting from conflicting custody orders between the states. See id.
at 182. This provided incentive for parents to "shop" for a forum that would decide the
case in their favor. See id. The PKPA was an attempt to create a uniform federal statute
supplying clear guidelines for determining child custody jurisdiction. See id. Essentially,
the PKPA imposes a federal "duty" upon states to give full faith and credit to custody
decrees of sister states. See id.
'o'. Id. at 174.
' See id. "The PKPA does not provide an implied cause of action in federal court to
determine which of two conflicting state custody decrees is valid." Id. Indeed, the PKPA
was intended to have the same operative effect as Full Faith and Credit statutes for child
custody determinations. See id. at 184-85. For further history of the PKPA and of
Congress's intent in its enactment, see Manuel E. Moraza Choisne, Judicial Solutions in
the United States of America for Parental Kidnapping in Child Custody Cases, 24 REV.
JUR. 309 (1990); Lynda R. Herring, Taking Away the Pawns: International Parental Ab-
duction and the Hague Convention, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 137 (1994).
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V. DOMA WILL PRODUCE CHAOTIC AND INCONSISTENT RESULTS
iN THE FAMILY LAW CONTEXT
A. DOMA Is Counterproductive and Will Create Conffision and
Uncertainty
A historical glance at the clear purpose of the enactment of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause illustrates the Framers' intent to create
certainty, reliability, uniformity, and unity between the states in
their dealings with each other."° However, Congress' extension of
its legislative power into the essentially state-dominated area of
marriage and family law through DOMA will create exactly the
opposite of uniformity and confidence."' In fact, DOMA produc-
es uncertainty and confusion in an area of law with a definite, sub-
stantial need of sureness and confidence-marriage."'
Married couples have a vital interest in the rights, responsibili-
ties, and incidents arising out of their marriage relationship."'
Marriage creates many expectations:.. (1) the expectation that the
couple will be perceived as legally and legitimately married to each
other;, (2) the expectation that their relationship will be understood
as lawful and moral; (3) the expectation that the couple's property
will be owned and divided according to the laws of marital proper-
ty division; (4) the expectation that children will be received into
the community as legitimate off-spring of the couple; (5) the ex-
pectation that one's health insurance through employment will
likely include one's spouse and children; and (6) the expectation
that the couple will be able to rely upon equal treatment with other
married couples based on their newly formed status as domestic
partners."
4
What transpires when these logical expectations of marriage
become indefinite and unreliable? Legally married partners, homo-
sexual or heterosexual, have justified expectations for legitimate
'0" See A Bill to Define and Protect the Institution of Marriage: Hearing on S. 1740
Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 104th Cong. 44.45
(1996) (statement of Professor Cass R. Sunstein), excerpted in 142 CONG. REC. H10112
(daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Boxer); LEFLAR, supra note 43; Henson, su-
pra note 42; Jackson, supra note 27.
110. See A Bill to Define and Protect the Institution of Marriage: Hearing on S. 1740
Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 104th Cong. 44-45
(1996) (statement of Professor Cass R. Sunstein), excerpted in 142 CONG. Rnc. H10112
(daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
t See Baian, supra note 21, at 421; Henson, supra note 42, at 588.
", See Balian, supra note 21, at 421.
" See id.; Barbara J. Cox, Sex, Marriage and Choice of Law, 1994 Wis. L. REv.
1033, 1065; Henson, supra note 42, at 588.
", See Cox, supra note 113, at 1062-63, 1065.
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family structuring flowing from their legal union."' Problems will
undoubtedly arise when these legitimate expectations are left to the
will of each of the fifty states to decide individually whether or
not they will be fulfilled.
In view of the lack of full faith and credit to out-of-state mar-
riages now permitted by DOMA, chaotic results are certain to
occur. For instance, picture a homosexual married couple forced to
relocate due to a job change. Legally married in Hawaii, their
domicile for many years, this couple must now make their home in
a new state which does not recognize their marriage. Under tradi-
tional conflicts of law doctrine, the couples' marital status would
remain unchanged upon relocation."6 This result supports the pol-
icies of predictability and reliability in marital status,"' two poli-
cies which require that the rights and responsibilities arising from
the marriage relationship-ongoing marital property rights, the right
to travel with married status, rights of inheritance, and rights to
legitimacy, custody, and visitation of children-continue without
difficulty."
8
The policies behind the general rule of validation of out-of-
state marriages support validating marriages between same-sex
couples."' The Second Restatement states that one of the primary
purposes for upholding existing marriages stems from the hardships
and inequities that would befall the couple and their children upon
non-recognition.' Marriage protects the financial and lawful ex-
"' See Henson, supra note 42, at 588.
" See Schombert, supra note 21, at 342.
"7 See LEFLAR, supra note 43, § 220.
"' See id. The consequences that would occur from the failure to uphold an ongoing,
legitimate marriage are disturbing and haphazard. Disturbing questions result What will
become of the children of same-sex couples who would now lack a "parent" or "step-par-
ent," for instance? What about consistency and stability within the family? Congress seeks
to protect and promote the "traditional" family, yet how do we define the traditional fami-
ly today? Is it not wiser to protect and encourage any "family" unit and close-knit associ-
ation of "family" members in today's world of single-parent families and "dead-beat
dads"? Why disrupt a stable, working family unit by way of a marriage law now lacking
in consistency and confidence, especially in an area of jurisprudence so much attuned to
the protection of children and relationships? And what of a divorced same-sex couple?
Axe children who have been raised in that legal marriage now without the legal visitation
of someone consistently known as a parent? If this new domicile refuses to recognize this
earlier marriage relationship, past custody and visitation decrees would conceivably become
null and void, since the new state believes no marriage ever existed. Past child support
decrees resulting from the termination of the earlier same-sex marriage would be consid-
ered null and void in states that do not recognize this former marriage. This would leave
the children of that marriage at a definite and harsh financial (as well as emotional) dis-
advantage. These children would now lack one "parent's" financial contribution to their
well-being. And what of children adopted by same-sex couples? Are they now without
parents? Are they now wards of their new state? Query: What happened to Congress'
"protection" of the family unit?
19. See Henson, supra note 42, at 588.
" See Schombert, supra note 21, at 338 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFICT
[Vol. 48:351
THE CONSTITU ONAL1TY OF DOMA
pectations of the parties. Support payments, the orderly disposition
of marital property upon divorce or the death of one spouse, the
right to bring a wrongful death action, the right to public assis-
tance, the right to insurance benefits, and the right to hospital
visitation privileges are all valid expectations of partners granted
the status of "marriage...'
Far from creating uniformity between states as the Framers had
anticipated, Congress' extension of its legislative power under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause in this instance will result in disorder
and discord among the states. DOMA restricts and undermines the
fundamental approach of the Clause and the conflicts of law doc-
trine, both of which were created to promote unity and comity
between states with different policies and agendas." Because it
fosters uncertainty and confusion in marriage law, DOMA frustrates
the expectations of couples relying on the legality of their same-
sex marriage. Chaotic results will unquestionably occur when these
partners find their marriages and the welfare of their families in
jeopardy.
B. Where Will It End?
Through DOMA, Congress has written a national marriage law.
DOMA applies to all fifty states, allowing them to make their own
individual decisions about whether to recognize same-sex marriages
performed in other states. Proponents argue that DOMA protects
the states from accepting an out-of-state same-sex marriage "man-
dated" by a foreign state court.'" While DOMA does not prevent
states from giving effect to same-sex marriage, 2  it suggests these
marriages, in contrast to heterosexual marriages, are not worthy of
recognition by all states. Ultimately, a federal marriage law has
been forged to govern state action in response to same-sex mar-
OF LAWS § 283 (1971)). Currently, limited recognition of same-sex relationships has been
granted even in states that have professed a policy against sanctioning of same-sex mar-
riages. See id. at 339. This has occurred in limited circumstances "where nonrecognition
would be fundamentally burdensome on the parties." Id. at 340 (citing In re Guardianship
of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct App. 1991)).
'2. See id.; see also In re Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684 (App. Div. 1990) (denying the
surviving homosexual partner the right to elect against the decedent's will as a surviving
spouse). Further, could homosexual spouses, legally married under Hawaiian law, be
charged with criminal sodomy in states that refuse to recognize same-sex marriages and
still retain state sodomy statutes? At this point, state sodomy statutes still remain in seven
states (Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Tennessee and Texas). See
Schombert, supra note 21, at 338.
12L See A Bill to Define and Protect the Institution of Marriage: Hearing on S. 1740
Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 104th Cong. 44-45
(statement of Professor Cass R. Sunstein), excerpted in 142 CONG. REC. H10112 (daily
ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Boxer); LEFLAR, supra note 43, § 73.
£23 See 142 CONG. REc. H7273 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Mclnnis).
2 See 142 CONG. REC. S1OlO1 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lott).
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riage recognition. DOMA is evidence that the federal government
is further extending its reach into the area of family law which has
traditionally been controlled by the states."2 The federal govern-
ment, through DOMA, seems to be prescribing how the private
relationships of its citizens should be regulated."2 Consequently,
DOMA invites the query, how far into the lives of American citi-
zens will this new federal "power" under the Clause extend in the
future?
If Congress may simply usurp state authority as it has through
DOMA, it is questionable as to where this appropriation of state
power will end. Conceivably, DOMA's interpretation of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause permits Congress to confidently create a
national divorce law by utilizing Congressional legislative power
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause." 7 Perhaps Congress will
be empowered by DOMA's interpretation of its grant of legislative
power under the Clause to inform states that they do not have to
recognize disagreeable out-of-state divorce judgments." Congress'
present interpretation of the Clause would also allow Congress to
prescribe that it is a state's prerogative whether or not to recognize
second or third marriages, as it may be against that state's public
policy of promoting the stability of marital relationships to recog-
nize such remarriages.'29 In addition, under DOMA's version of
Congress' grant of legislative power under the Clause, the federal
government may now have the power to legislate the "appropriate"
age at which persons may marry. Hence, a national marital mini-
mum age requirement could be established under Congress' present
interpretation of the Clause.
Under DOMA's interpretation of the grant of federal legislative
power provided in the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congress
could simply declare that any state law which its members dislike
has no effect in other states.' This rendition of the Clause's
implementation power could give rise to dangerous precedent as
the above hypotheticals illustrate. If the Full Faith and Credit
Clause enables Congress to exempt same-sex marriages from its
application, Congress may also exempt from the Clause other judg-
'2 See 142 CONG. REc. S10102 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kenne-
dy).
" See generally 142 CONG. REC. H7274 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Abercrombie) (stating that "when we move into the area of the private relationships of
other people .... we at least ought to show some respect for the human context").
121 See 142 CoNG. REc. S10118 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein).
'z See id.
9 See id.
130 See id. Congress could conceivably authorize a state to nullify a judgment which it
is reluctant to follow. See id.
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ments states could nullify at their discretion, "including not only
decrees affecting family structure but also specified types of com-
mercial judgments."'' Inasmuch as DOMA bestows upon Con-
gress the constitutional authority to expand its legislative power
under the Clause in such disquieting ways as Professor Tribe antic-
ipates, it produces a serious danger to traditionally state controlled
areas of legislation of which family law is representative.
VI. DOMA Is AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXTENSION OF
CONGRESSIONAL POWER UNDER THE FULL FArIH AND CREDIT
CLAUSE AS EVIDENCED BY THE LANGUAGE AND PURPOSE OF THE
CLAUSE, ITS PREVIOUS APPLICATION IN FAMILY LAW, AND THE
PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPION
A. The Language Argument
During the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the drafters of
the United States Constitution appointed a special committee to
reconsider the language of the Clause as it was written under the
Articles of Confederation.' As it stood, the Clause read:
Full Faith and Credit ought to be given in each State to
the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every
other State; and the Legislature shall, by general laws, pre-
scribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceed-
ings shall be proved, and the effect which judgments ob-
tained in one State shall have in another.33
The committee subsequently moved to substitute the word
"shall" with the word "may" between the words "legislature" and
"by the general laws."'3 4 Further, the portion "judgments by one
"' Letter from Lawrence Tribe, Professor of Constitutional Law, to Senator Edward
Kennedy (1996), reprinted in 142 CONG. REC. S5932 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Kennedy) [hereinafter Letter from Lawrence Tribe]. Professor Tribe describes an
analogy between DOMA and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). In Katzenbach,
the Court interpreted another of the Constitution's few clauses that expressly authorize
Congress to enforce a constitutional mandate directed to the states. According to Professor
Tribe, the Court stated that "Congress may effectuate such a mandate, but may not 'exer-
cise discretion in the other direction [by] enact[ing]' statutes that 'dilute' the mandate's
self-executing force...." Letter from Lawrence Tribe, supra, reprinted in 142 CONG.
REC. S5932 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (quoting 384 U.S. at
651 n.10). Professor Tribe argues a similar principle must guide the interpretation of the
legislative power granted under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See id. He contends the
text of the Clause leaves "no real doubt that its self-executing reach may not be negated
or nullified, in whole or in part, under the 'guise' of legislatively enforcing or effectuat-
ing the Clause." Id. (emphasis added).
J See Cook, supra note 38, at 424.
t= Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
14 See id.
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state shall have in another" was stricken and replaced with the
word "thereof' after the word "effect."' 35 The outcome was the
Clause as it appears today: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of
every other State, and the Legislature may, by general laws, pre-
scribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings
shall be proved and the effect thereof."'36
Through this new language, the Framers intended to furnish
Congress with the optional power to prescribe the effect, or legal
consequences, in the province of one state, of another state's legis-
lative acts, records, or judgments. 37 One author states Congress'
legislative authority under the Clause creates the problem of deter-
mining the intended extent of its utilization, which is the question
in the case of DOMA' 38 Hence the inquiry in this Note: Has
Congress extended its full faith and credit implementing power too
far with DOMA?
The Clause states that Congress may legislate as to the "effect"
of acts, records, and judicial proceedings of one state in anoth-
er.'39 However, the Clause confers no power authorizing Congress
to decree that one state's acts, records, or proceedings have no
effect in the state of another."4 While an affirmative legislative
power may be supported by the language of the Clause, it is un-
likely that the Framers intended to provide Congress with a "nega-
tive" power under the Clause as well. 4' While the Clause states
Congress may legislate as to the "effect" of one state's acts or
judgments in another, it does not declare that Congress may give
these acts or judgments no effect whatsoever.42
'13 See id.
'3 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
'37 See Cook, supra note 38, at 426.
" See id. ("Congress has hardly begun to exercise the powers of legislation thus con-
ferred upon it. ... Our problem is to determine the extent of the powers of legislation
given to Congress but which have been only partially exercised.") (emphasis added). Cook
discusses the exercise of Congress' power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause to create federal law providing for the "direct enforcement"
of one state's laws in other states. See id. However, the federal law providing for the
non-enforcement of one state's laws in another state is never considered. This suggests
that Cook never envisioned the Clause implemented in such a way as Congress is at-
tempting to do through DOMA. That is, Cook never examined the possibility that Con-
gress could exploit its power under the Clause by empowering states to give no effect or
no full faith and credit to the laws of another state.
139- See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
10 See A Bill to Define and Protect the Institution of Marriage: Hearing on S. 1740
Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 104th Cong. 44-45
(statement of Professor Cass R. Sunstein), excerpted in 142 CONG. REc. H10112 (daily
ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
141. See id.
12 See id.
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Accordingly, the language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
does not grant Congress the power to authorize a nullification of
the orders or proceedings of one state over another.43 One could
easily imagine the states of 1787, extremely protective of their
sovereignty, quickly pulling out of the infant union had the Fram-
ers allowed the Clause to produce such a result. On the contrary,
as set out above, a historical study reveals that the Clause was
designed to assist Congress in implementing the Full Faith and
Credit Clause in order to facilitate state unity and uniformity. The
Framers wished to decrease animosity and tension between the
states and to increase state comity and confidence. A grant of
congressional power allowing a state to restrict and negate the acts
and judgments of its neighboring states would clearly not have
produced unity and comity; only anger and hostility would have
resulted between already antagonistic state governments had the
Framers intended such an interpretation." Indeed, allowing the
states to refuse recognition of a public act, judgment, or proceeding
of another state is the exact opposite of what the "Founding Fa-
thers laid forth in the Clause itself."' 45
DOMA's proponents claim that a congressional act authorizing
states to give no effect at all to a specific category of out-of-state
acts and judgments is a general law prescribing "the effect there-
of." However, this argument is circular and, as Professor Tribe
stated in his letter to Congress, "[it] is a play on words, not a
legal argument."'" If the proponents' argument above were ac-
cepted, this interpretation would in fact add a new section to the
Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause, 47 permitting states to
refuse to recognize any legal marriage in another state." This
result directly conflicts with the very specific understanding of the
purpose and effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and of
conflicts of law analysis, namely, the creation of uniformity, unity,
and comity between the states, and certainty and predictability for
state citizens.
It would do violence not only to the letter but also to the spirit
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to construe it as a fount of
affirmative authority for Congress "to set asunder the States that
" See 142 CONG. REC. S10107 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
t' See A Bill to Define and Protect the Institution of Marriage: Hearing on S. 1740
Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 104th Cong. 44-45
(statement of Professor Cass R. Sunstein), excerpted in 142 CONG. REC. H10112 (daily
ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
1'4 142 CONG. REC. S10107 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
" Letter of Lawrence Tribe, supra note 131, reprinted in 142 CONG. REc. S5932
(daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
"7 See 142 CONG. REC. S10107 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
See id.
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this Clause brought together."'49 Professor Tribe states that the
Clause is a vital unifying section of the Constitution and is being
subverted by DOMA.'5° Furthermore, nothing in the language or
history of the Clause indicates that equitable marital decrees should
be excluded from full faith and credit.' Certainly the Framers
could have easily limited the wording of the Clause to express this
idea had they so intended.' In fact, a failed attempt was made
to limit the wording of the Articles of Confederation version of the
Clause.'53 Conceivably, the Framers could have changed the
wording of the Clause to omit marital decrees had they intended
that full faith and credit be given to all acts and judgments of
states except marriage declarations. 54
B. Congress' Past Implementation of Their Power under the
Clause
Congress' utilization of its legislative power under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause in the past demonstrates that DOMA's
enactment is the first time in the history of the Constitution that
Congress empowered states to disregard the Clause. 55 Historical-
ly, Congress has only legislated the effect the Clause should have
in the conflicts of law context." For instance, Congress has pre-
viously legislated that the Clause will apply specifically to particu-
lar judicial decrees, such as in the recognition of out-of-state child
support or protection orders.'57 Congress has created these Acts to
give effect to judicial proceedings of other states-not to authorize
that no effect be given to these decrees.5 8
The PKPA is a primary example of Congress's exercising its
implementation power under the Clause in the family law context.
The PKPA is a product of a constitutional exercise of appropriate
Congressional law-making power used to implement the Full Faith
and Credit Clause."19 The PKPA implements, or gives effect to,
out-of-state custody decrees; it is not restrictive, as is DOMA."se
" Letter of Lawrence Tribe, supra note 131, reprinted in 142 CoNG. REC. S5933
(daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
'" See id,; see also Balian, supra note 21, at 413 (stating purpose of the Clause is as
a unifying force).
"' See Balian, supra note 21, at 406 (examining the plain language and history of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause).
ISZ See id.
"s See id.
' See id.
'" See 142 CoNG. REc. S10107 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
1 See id.
" See id.
" See id.
1" See id.
-- See id.
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The PKPA invokes the strength and authority of the Clause to
produce uniform, certain results in out-of-state child custody mat-
ters.161 DOMA creates the opposite outcomes in cases of same-
sex marriage.
DOMA attempts to exploit Congress' implementation power
under the Clause by employing it in a way contrary to which it
was intended. The Framers' goal for the Clause was to create
harmony, uniformity, and predictability in a new nation of individ-
ual states striving earnestly to protect their sovereignty.'62 While
the PKPA uses the legislative authority of the Clause to reach
precisely this goal, DOMA will only produce friction, mistrust, and
animosity between states as one declares void the decrees of anoth-
er.' This result was not within the language or purpose of the
Clause as created by the Framers of the Constitution and is there-
fore constitutionally suspect.
C. The Public Policy Exception to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and to the Conflicts of Law Doctrine
The Public Policy Exception has been cited by numerous oppo-
nents of DOMA as authority empowering states to invalidate out-
of-state marriages repugnant to public policy.'" Opponents argue
DOMA is unnecessary because it attempts to give the states a
power they already possess by way of the Exception." While a
strong argument, the application of the Exception to same-sex
marriages may not, in reality, yield so unequivocal a result.
As stated above, the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws
6. See Mortland, supra note 32, at 69; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994). Congress
exercised its power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause by making the jurisdictional
and substantive provisions of the PKPA the standard for out-of-state custody orders. Fur-
thermore, other previous congressional acts issued pursuant to the implementing power of
the Clause (such as the VAWA and the FFCCSOA) each provide that states give effect to
and recognize orders of other states. No act created with the authority conferred by the
Clause has ever attempted to limit the application of full faith and credit until DOMA.
See Mortland, supra note 32, at 69.
'6. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943) (explaining that
the Full Faith and Credit Clause acts as a nationally unifying force), overruled by Thomas
v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980); LEFLAR, supra note 43, § 73 (ex-
plaining that one of the principle assurances of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is unity
among the states); Cook, supra note 38, at 422 (noting the goal of achieving interstate
uniformity through the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Henson, supra note 42, at 584 (not-
ing the purpose behind the Full Faith and Credit Clause was to provide uniformity); Jack-
son, supra note 27 (examining the historical context of the Full Faith and Credit Clause).
.The PKPA is a constitutional extension of Congress' power under the Clause since
it helps advance predictability to the structuring of family life; it creates increased certain-
ty and harmony for family members. See Henson, supra note 42, at 591.
'6' See 142 CONG. REC. S10118 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein).
" See id. DOMA is a "solution in search of a problem." 142 CONG. REc. S10107
(daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
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rejects the general rule of validation of out-of-state marriages if the
marriage is repugnant to a strong public policy of the state in
which the couple is currently residing."6 According to Dean
Herma Hill Kay, the usual conflicts of law doctrine governing the
recognition of marriages performed out of state provides that the
state where recognition of marriage is sought need not validate a
marriage if it would violate an acceptable public policy. 67 A state
with a well-founded prohibition against same-sex marriages could,
under the Exception, refuse to sustain an out-of-state marriage it
found repugnant to these policies.6s Consequently, opponents ar-
gue that DOMA is pointless and unwarranted: It does not give
states any authority they lack, and it intrudes upon a traditionally
state-controlled area of law.'69 At present, states have the power
to do what this legislation purports to do without federal interven-
tion or protectionism.7 Thus, opponents assert, the issue of
same-sex marriage recognition should be left to the individual
states to decide under their own laws and policies.
Because the states rely on the Public Policy Exception in con-
flicts of law situations, it is not surprising that fourteen states have
already attempted to exercise the power under the Exception to
assert such a policy position in anticipation of the Baehr deci-
sion.' Indeed, states have dealt with similar situations in out-of-
state marriage conflicts in the past by asserting the Exception."7
Historically, the Exception has been applied in situations in which
states refused to sustain polygamous, incestuous, or underaged mar-
riages because they were "offensive" to state public policies." 3
'6 See RESTATEMENT (SECoND) oF CoNFLcr oF LAWS § 283 (1971) (rejecting the
general rule if it "contravenes the strong public policy of another state"); Hovermill, supra
note 21, at 455.
" See 142 CONG. REC. S10102 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kenne-
dy).
'a See Hovermill, supra note 21, at 455.
'69. See A Bill to Define and Protect the Institution of Marriage: Hearing on S. 1740
Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 104th Cong. 44-45
(1996) (statement of Professor Cass R. Sunstein), excerpted in 142 CoNG. REC. H10112
(daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
"'0 See 142 CONG. REC. S10118 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein) (noting that states may refuse to recognize those marriages which violate public
policy). During the DOMA congressional debates, Representative Moran of Virginia asked,
"Why are we debating an unnecessary bill [when the states already hold the power to re-
fuse to honor same-sex marriages]?" 142 CONG. REc. H7489 (daily ed. July 12, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Moran). "I'm afraid the real answer is that it is political exploitation
of prejudicial attitudes." Id.
171. See 142 CONG. REc. H7492 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Skaggs).
172 See id.
'" See id.; see also supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. For examples of the
application of the Public Policy Exception in the past, see Lynch v. Bowen, 681 F. Supp.
506 (N.D. I1. 1988); Tyus v. Tyus, 206 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1984); In re Estate of
Loughmiller, 629 P.2d 156 (Kan. 1981); Meeker v. Meeker, 243 A.2d 80 (NJ. 1968);
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The current Exception argument by opponents of DOMA merely
extends the application of the Exception from the above types of
marriages to same-sex marriages.
While the reasoning above is agreeable to those who argue
against DOMA's enactment, in reality the Public Policy Exception
may not produce such certain outcomes in cases of same-sex mar-
riage conflicts of law. Ultimately, under the current position of the
Second Restatement, the legitimate public policies of a state may
not be enough to invalidate all out-of-state same-sex marriages in
all conflicts situations.
While each state ordinarily has its own conflicts of law doc-
trine to employ in conflicts cases, many states look to the Second
Restatement for authoritative guidance in marriage conflict situa-
tions. The most applicable section regarding interstate same-sex
marriage recognition is section 283.'"4 Section 283 provides that:
(1) The validity of a marriage will be determined by the
local law of the state which, with respect to the particular
issue, has the most significant relationship to the spouses
and the marriage under the principles stated in s[ection] 6.
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state
where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be
recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public
policy of another state which had the most significant
relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of
the marriage.'75
While this section provides states with a vehicle by which to
invalidate out-of-state same-sex marriages repugnant to their state
policies, by its own words the Public Policy Exception restricts its
application to the state that had the most significant relationship to
the parties and the marriage at the time it was contracted.'76 To
apply the Exception properly, its application would be restricted "to
states that had a [significant] relationship with the couple at the
time of the marriage."" By this construction, even if a state had
strong public policies against same-sex marriage, if the couple had
worked and resided in State-1 for several years, married there, and
Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65 (NJ. 1958); Leszinske v. Pool, 798 P.2d 1049 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1990); Maurer v. Maurer, 60 A.2d 440 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1948); State v. Bell, 66
Tenn. 9 (1872); In re Vetas Estate, 170 P.2d 183 (Utah 1946); Kinney v. Commonwealth,
71 Va. 858 (Ct. App. 1878).
174, See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFuCT OF LAWS § 283 (1971) (stating which
laws will govern the validity of a marriage).
"7S Id. (emphasis added); see also Note, supra note 83, at 2039 (noting the importance
of stability and predictability in a marital relationship).
'74. See RBsrATENmT (SEcoND) OF CoNFucr OF LAWS § 283 (1971).
'" Note, supra note 83, at 2044.
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then moved to State-2, State-2 would be unable to appeal to the
Exception.
Picture again our same-sex married couple forced to relocate
due to a job change. The parties lived in Hawaii for several years
before their marriage. They each worked in Hawaii, paid taxes, and
perhaps sent their children to Hawaiian public schools. When this
couple moves to a new state, that new home state does not have as
significant a connection to the couple as Hawaii does. In order for
the new home state to apply the Public Policy Exception, it must
have had the "most significant relationship to the spouses and the
marriage at the time of the marriage." Therefore, since Hawaii's
connection to the parties is strongest, the new state will be unable
to benefit from an appeal to the Exception under the Second
Restatement's "significant relationship" approach.
The application of the Restatement's "significant relationship"
conflicts of law provision is a sensible manner in which to deter-
mine which state law should prevail. It properly considers the ex-
pectations of the parties, the states' interest in the marriage, and
the states' public policies.'78 Weighing the parties' connection to
each state allows a fair and equitable determination of which
states' law should control.
This careful balancing approach lies in stark contrast to
DOMA's arbitrary, haphazard application. DOMA does not balance
the interests of the conflicting states, nor does it consider even
slightly the expectations of the parties. While the Restatement's
approach provides an exception to the general rule of marriage
recognition, it does so by a careful balancing of interests.'"
Therefore, it affords an appropriate, impartial decision based on
reason and equity. In contrast, DOMA gives individual states the
power to arbitrarily expand the Public Policy Exception to invali-
date marriages without regard to a state's connection to the parties.
The cautious weighing formula provided in the Exception, used to
promote both the welfare of the parties and of the states, is care-
lessly discarded in favor of an unprecedented and erratic rule of
law. Because DOMA so heedlessly disregards the history of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause and the balancing formula of the
common law illustrated by the Restatement, one begins to wonder
whether DOMA's opponents were not correct when they declared
that DOMA was "designed to divide Americans, to drive a wedge
between one group of citizens and the rest of the country, solely
" See LEFLAR, supra note 43.
". See Note, supra note 83, at 2048.
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for partisan advantage," eight weeks before the November, 1996
election."
VII. CONCLUSION
DOMA stands as an unconstitutional extension of congressional
power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution. DOMA usurps power from the states and employs an
unprecedented manipulation of the Clause in order to prescribe a
majoritarian concept of marriage and family. As Senator Carol
Moseley-Braun (D-IL) expressed before Congress, a historical ex-
amination of our nation and of the Constitution which guides it
clearly illustrates that DOMA is an unconstitutional congressional
attempt to legislate in an area of law reserved to the states.'
The Full Faith and Credit Clause was created by the Framers of
the Constitution to bind us together as a nation. It should not be
employed by those we entrust to protect our interests in a manner
that can only tear us apart.
JENNIE R. SHUKI-KUNZE €
142 CONG. REc. S10102 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
S. See 142 CONG. REC. S10104 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Moseley-Braun).
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